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Abstract 
Coordination games have become a critical tool of analysis in fields such as development and 
institutional economics. Understanding behavior in coordination games is an important step towards 
understanding the differing success of teams, firms and nations. This paper investigates the relationship 
between personal attributes (cognitive ability, risk-aversion, patience) and behavior and outcomes in 
coordination games, an issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has never been studied before. For the 
repeated coordination game that we consider, we find that: (1) cognitive ability has no bearing on any 
aspect of behavior or outcomes; (2) pairs of players who are more patient are more likely to coordinate 
well and earn higher payoffs; and (3) risk-aversion has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or 
outcomes. These results are robust to controlling for personality traits and demographic characteristics. 
JEL codes: D02, D23, O12, O43 
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1. Introduction 
Social interactions are routinely characterized by multiple equilibria: every game theory text makes this 
point. Often, these equilibria are Pareto-ranked, so the failure to coordinate efficiently is a genuine 
tragedy (inter alia, Schelling (1960), Hardin (1995), Weingast (1997), Weber (2006)). The tragedy is 
especially salient in the development and institutions literatures: Bardhan (2005) notes that “pervasive 
coordination failures” may “afflict an economy at early stages of industrial transformation” (p. 2, italics 
in original), while Ray (1998) devoted an entire chapter of his influential development economics 
textbook to the issue of coordination failures. And of course, coordination failure models are a part of 
the Keynesian business cycle tradition (Cooper and John (1988)). In this paper, we search for individual 
and groups traits that predict coordination on better equilibria. 
We focus on a particular coordination game, the repeated stag hunt. It is depicted in Figure 1. The stag 
hunt’s key features are the presence of two pure-strategy equilibria that are Pareto-rankable: a 
dominating equilibrium (stag, stag) that is risky, and a dominated equilibrium (rabbit, rabbit) that is risk 
free. 
Since many social environments – political, work, social – contain stag hunt, team-joining elements 
(Skyrms (2003)), the ability to play stag in a repeated game may be an important skill for productive 
social interaction. In public choice settings, the stag hunt might reflect the decision to go it alone 
(building yourself a swimming pool, or “Bowling Alone”; Putnam (1995)) or to cooperate in producing an 
excludable good (helping to build a community pool or a bowling league); in firm settings, the stag hunt 
might reflect the decision to toil in a cubicle rather than volunteer to join a high-status team project. 
Theory points toward three attributes that could predict coordination on the Pareto-ranked outcome: 
risk tolerance (a predictor of one-shot coordination, since hunting rabbit is the risk-dominant outcome), 
patience (due to the repetition); and cognitive skill (in part because cognitive skill usually predicts 
patience and risk tolerance (Frederick (2005), Benjamin et al. (2006), Burks et al. (2009)), and also 
because understanding a game’s rules typically helps in winning a game). Individuals and groups differ 
widely in these attributes, so if they predict coordination failure they likely predict weaker institutions, 
less social capital, and perhaps even greater business cycle volatility. We wish see which of these 
personal attributes are most salient in a laboratory setting. 
This, this paper seeks to answer three questions: 
1. What is the relationship between risk-aversion and behavior/outcomes in coordination games? 
2. What is the relationship between patience and behavior/outcomes in coordination games? 
3. What is the relationship between cognitive ability and behavior/outcomes in coordination games? 
Also known as the two-player minimum-effort game, the stag hunt has been studied extensively in the 
literature on coordination games, especially the experimental literature (Van Huyck et al. (1990); see 
Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for a review). Scholars have been particularly interested in analyzing 
behavior in -period versions of the game, with an emphasis on understanding the factors that make 
sustained (efficient) play of (stag, stag) more likely. These factors include precedent (Van Huyck et al. 
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(1991), Camerer and Knez (1994)), information about play in previous periods (Bornstein et al. (2002), 
Devetag (2003)), leadership (Weber at al. (2001), Brandts et al. (2007)), horizon (Berninghaus and Erhart 
(1998), Schmidt et al. (2003)), communication (Cooper et al. (1992), Blume and Ortmann (2007)) and the 
exact nature of the payoffs (Rankin et al. (2000), Brandts and Cooper (2006)). 
However, while economists have intensively studied whether differences in institutions influence 
coordination, they have not yet investigated (with the exception of Al-Ubaydli (2009)) whether 
differences in the players themselves influence coordination. Our paper begins that process. 
In our experiment, we record player choices in 10-period stag hunts, and we collect data on players’ 
attributes: cognitive ability, patience and risk-aversion. We then study the relationship between a 
player’s (pair’s) attributes and her (their) behavior in the stag hunt.2 In their survey of the literature on 
cognitive ability and personality traits, Borghans et al. (2008) demonstrate the importance of such 
attributes to key life outcomes (such as labor market earnings), and they call for more research on their 
effects. 
Since variation in such attributes is naturally-occurring rather than being varied exogenously by an 
experimenter, we try to control for as many potential sources of endogeneity as possible. We collect 
data on personality traits and demographics. Such controls are particularly important given the 
frequently reported positive relationships between cognitive ability and patience, and cognitive ability 
and risk-lovingness (Frederick (2005), Benjamin et al. (2006), Burks et al. (2009)). 
Our main results are as follows: 
1. Risk-aversion has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes in the stag hunt 
2. Pairs of players who are more patient are more likely to play (stag, stag) and earn higher payoffs 
3. Cognitive ability has no bearing on any aspect of behavior or outcomes in the stag hunt 
Result 3 might seem unexpected, particularly since recent work (Jones (2009), Al-Ubaydli et al (2010)) 
has found that cognitive skills predict success in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments. However, 
Mueller (2004) notes that repeated coordination games like the stag hunt can are far less cognitively 
demanding than repeated prisoner’s dilemmas: 
…Pareto-optimal sets of strategies can be expected to emerge when coordination games 
are repeated, under far less demanding behavioral assumptions than are needed to 
sustain Pareto-optimal outcomes in prisoner’s dilemma supergames. (Mueller, 2004, p. 
15.) 
                                                           
2
 To the best of our knowledge, no such study has been conducted. Al-Ubaydli (2009) looks at the relationship 
between behavior in a coordination game and risk-aversion, but without any additional controls. Burks et al. 
(2009) examines the impact of such factors on behavior in the one-shot, sequential prisoner’s dilemma, and Jones 
(2009) and Al-Ubaydli et al. (2010) mimic the present paper but for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. There are 
good reasons to expect similarity in the mechanisms linking personal attributes to behavior across these different 
game types (see the discussion below), however the games still differ in important ways and this is reflected in the 
different results obtained. 
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Mueller points to an evolutionary game theory literature on the limited cognitive demands of 
coordination games (inter alia, Warneryd (1990), Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993)). Our 
experimental results thus confirm both Mueller’s specific prediction and the deep relevance of this 
larger theoretical literature. 
In the vast majority of empirical studies, all three of these traits – cognitive ability, patience, and risk 
tolerance – are modestly positively correlated. Thus, the fact that only one of these traits strongly 
predicts stag hunt coordination should be of interest to researchers modeling the underlying structure 
and effects of these traits. Our results suggest that patience is the driving cognitive force in Pareto-
optimal coordination: in our data, beta conquers all. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the experimental design. Section 3 is the 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental design 
A. Data collection and order 
In our experiment, for each participant, we collected data on the following: 
• Behavior in the coordination game 
• Personal attributes 
o Cognitive ability 
o Patience 
o Risk-aversion 
o Personality traits 
o Demographic information 
We had subjects play the game and then collect data on personal attributes and cognitive traits.3 The 
precise order of tasks was as given in Figure 2.4 
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 As has been demonstrated in the extensive psychology literature on framing and anchoring (Bacharach and 
Chartrand (2000), Epley and Gilovich (2004)), any data based on human choices is sensitive to payoff-irrelevant 
features of the environment and experimental procedure. The main payoff-irrelevant feature of concern for our 
study is that there may be a spillover between the two data classes, e.g., the fact that we are collecting data on 
attributes affects how people play in a coordination game, regardless of the attributes. To minimize such bias, we 
made the subjects play the game first. 
4
 The method for measuring cognitive ability (a 45-minute Raven’s test; see below) was the most mentally 
exhausting for participants, and accounted for the lion’s share of cognitive effort expended during a session. We 
therefore made it the last task. 
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B. Procedure 
All sessions were run at an Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Sciences computer laboratory at 
George Mason University (GMU). Participants were recruited from a campus database of students who 
had expressed an interest in economics experiments. Sessions lasted an average of approximately 100 
minutes (inclusive of check-in and payment processing), and average earnings were approximately $30 
per participant. Sessions had exactly 8, 10 or 12 participants. 
Some of the tasks were incentivized while others were not (the detailed descriptions and explanations 
are below). Participants received a fixed fee for each unincentivized task. The drawback of incentivized 
tasks is that they potentially generate wealth effects. To minimize such wealth effects, it was common 
knowledge that participants would be paid for exactly one of the incentivized tasks, with a die roll at the 
end of the experiment determining which. 
Since, by the standards of GMU experiments, the experiment was quite long, cognitively intensive and 
involved large stakes, we wanted to convey as much payment credibility as possible. Consequently, for 
each of the unincentivized tasks, we paid the participants in cash immediately after they completed the 
task (we also paid the show-up fee in cash at the start of the experiment). 
For the entirety of the experiment, participants sat at private, individual desks with other participants 
within eyeshot in the same room. There was no communication. Though most of the tasks were 
undertaken on the computer, all instructions were printed, handed out and read aloud to all 
participants. See the appendix for the full instructions. 
Coordination game
5: Participants were anonymously and randomly assigned a partner who would be 
their partner for 10 rounds. Each round, the two players would play the stag hunt in Figure 1 (with an 
exchange rate of 1 point = 1¢). Strategies were given a neutral frame (green, blue rather than stag, 
rabbit). 
At the end of each round, participants were only informed of their earnings from that round rather than 
the actual outcome. Thus anyone playing rabbit could not infer whether their partner was playing stag 
or rabbit. (Anyone playing stag could infer their partner’s choice.) This is the norm in the -player 
versions of the minimum-effort game, though some studies examine behavior when the entire action 
vector is common knowledge after each round.  
This could have the effect of making players more likely to play the risky stag strategy in order to acquire 
information about the other player’s behavior. Thus, in a repeated game, playing stag is in an important 
dimension safer (because more informative) than playing rabbit. This phenomenon is likely of genuine 
real-world importance for stag-hunt-style interactions, and may explain why risk-aversion ultimately has 
no influence in the repeated game.  
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 In addition to playing a coordination game, participants played a repeated prisoner dilemma as part of separate 
study (see Al-Ubaydli et al. (2010)). We randomized which they played first by session, and we included session 
effects in all our econometric tests to control for this. As mentioned above, it was common knowledge that 
participants would be paid for exactly one of the incentivized tasks.  
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Personality survey: Participants were asked to complete a Big-5 personality survey, a standard measure 
of personality traits (Borghans et al. (2008)). Participants responded to each of 50 statements about 
their personality using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = very inaccurate, 5 = very accurate). The 50 questions 
broke down into 10 questions corresponding to 5 personality traits: 
• Openness to new experiences, e.g., I have a vivid imagination 
• Conscientiousness, e.g., I pay attention to details 
• Agreeableness, e.g., I feel little concern for others 
• Extraversion, e.g., I keep in the background 
• Neuroticism, e.g., I get stressed out easily 
Participants were paid a fixed fee of $5 after completing this survey and the demographic survey 
regardless of their responses. 
Demographic survey: Participants were asked a few questions about their personal demographics 
(gender, age, class etc) and their self-reported scores in standardized tests (SAT, GRE etc).6  
Risk-aversion survey: Participants completed a Hey-Orme risk preferences test (Hey and Orme (1994)).7 
Each period, the participant is faced with a choice between two lotteries, each over the same four 
outcomes ($0, $10, $20, $30). The participant chooses which she prefers (or expresses indifference). The 
participant does this for 20 pairs (periods).8 To generate incentives for truthful revelation, participants 
were informed that – if it were the unique incentivized task for which they were paid – one of the pairs 
would be selected at random at the end and each participant will play out the lottery for which she 
declared a preference. 
We selected a Hey-Orme test rather than the more conventionally deployed Holt-Laury test (Holt and 
Laury (2002)) because it is a richer test that permits more accurate identification of economic risk-
preference parameters. Using maximum likelihood estimation (see Harrison and Rutstrom (2008), 
Andersen et al. (2009); see Wilcox (2009) for a new microeconometric model of risk-attitudes), one can 
use the choice data to estimate the parameter  in the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function   	, where  denotes $ wealth.  is a measure of risk-
lovingness (the negative of risk-aversion). 
Patience survey: Participants were presented with a multiple price list (Harrison et al. (2002), Andersen 
et al. (2006)) with 20 rows. For each row, the participant is faced with a choice between $10.00 
tomorrow and $Y in one week. The amount $Y started at $10.50 and increased in $0.50 increments to 
$20.00. To generate incentives for truthful revelation, participants were informed that – if it were the 
unique incentivized task for which they would be paid – one of the pairs would be selected at random at 
the end of the experiment and each participant paid according to their choice. 
                                                           
6
 Self-reported SAT (GRE) scores correlated 0.27 (0.20) with IQ.  
7
 The instructions (see the appendix) are adapted from a set provided by Glenn Harrison. 
8
 Participants do not know how many lottery pairs they will have to ponder. 
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Tests of patience involving reasonable horizons require participants to leave the laboratory and receive 
payments at a later time. This generates credibility issues: to what extent are differences in observed 
preferences the result of differences in patience (the goal) vs. differences in the perceived credibility of 
the experimenter with respect to payment delivery? (See Andersen et al. (2009) and Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2010) for an extensive discussion of these issues.) 
To minimize any variation in perceived credibility, we took several steps to demonstrate our credibility 
at the decision-making stage. First, both options in each choice entail an amount that can only be 
received after exiting the laboratory, i.e., there is a front-end delay (see Harrison et al. (2002)). 
Second, they were handed a contract on university letterhead signed by us and them confirming the 
earliest time that they can retrieve the envelope at a specified location on campus (in one day or in 7 
days, depending on their stated preference).  
Our measure of patience is therefore the number of rows where the participant preferred the amount 
to be received in one week (rather than the following day). 
Cognitive ability: Borghans et al. (2008) define cognitive ability as the ability to: 
• Understand complex ideas 
• Adapt effectively to the environment 
• Learn from experience 
• Reason 
• Overcome obstacles through purposeful thought 
For a complete discussion of intelligence and its measurement, see Neisser et al. (1995). There are many 
tests of cognitive ability. We use the Raven’s standard progressive matrices test of intelligence, which is 
one of the standard tools used in the literature (Borghans et al. (2008)). 
The test is composed of 60 problems. Each problem consists of a pattern with a missing segment, and 6-
to-8 segments, only one of which correctly completes the pattern (see the appendix for examples). 
Participants were given 45 minutes to complete the test. The test was unincentivized. Borghans et al. 
(2008) remark that the effect of incentivizing tests of cognitive ability is for scores in the lower tail to 
improve. We decided against using incentives because we wanted to maintain comparability between 
our results and the results reported in the psychology literature (which typically do not use incentives). 
C. Research hypotheses 
The above procedure yields data on a vector of attributes that represents our explanatory variables. We 
investigate the effect of these explanatory variables on the following dependent variables: 
• An individual’s decision to play stag in a given period 
• A pair’s success in achieving a play of stag-stag in a given period 
• An individual’s total earnings for the 10-period coordination game 
8 
 
• A pair’s total earnings for the 10-period coordination game 
The previous literature gives us little basis for predictions about the effect of personality or 
demographics on any of the above dependent variables. Here, we offer hypotheses for the effects of 
risk-aversion, cognitive skill, and patience. 
In a one-shot sense, playing rabbit is risk-free while playing stag generates payoff risk (this underlies the 
concepts of risk- vs. payoff-dominance; see Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). Thus it seems sensible to expect 
that risk-aversion will be a substantial determinant of outcomes. In a (modified) 3-period version of the 
stag hunt, Al-Ubaydli (2009) found that risk-aversion was negatively related to picking stag, though that 
study did not control for any additional attributes. 
Using aggregate data, Jones (2009) finds that people drawn from distributions with higher cognitive 
ability are more likely to play cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma. Using individual-level data, and 
controlling for risk-aversion and a host of additional attributes (though not patience), Burks et al. (2009) 
find a positive relationship between cognitive ability and the likelihood of playing trust and reciprocate 
in a one-shot, sequential prisoner’s dilemma.  
Jones’ (2009) explanation for these findings is that higher cognitive ability allows people to see the 
future with greater resolution; he also notes that the greater patience of high-cognitive-ability 
individuals makes Axelrod’s (1984) “shadow of the future” more salient. Both channels imply that high-
ability players are therefore better able to appreciate the benefits of early cooperation, and 
consequently cooperate more. Additionally, he notes that they are more likely to understand the literal 
rules of the game. The link between understanding the repeated prisoner’s dilemma and “winning” in 
the repeated prisoner’s dilemma is emphasized by Axelrod (1984). Putterman et al. (2010) find that 
higher IQ predicts higher contributions to a repeated public goods game, which is an -person 
prisoner’s dilemma. Since none of the three studies control for patience, and patience is usually 
positively related to cognitive ability (Burks et al. (2009)), it is not clear whether cognitive ability or 
patience is driving the result. 
Despite the key payoff differences between the stag hunt and the prisoner’s dilemma, they do share a 
requirement of cooperation for avoidance of an inefficient outcome. Consequently, we would predict 
that cognitive ability, patience or both are positively related to plays of stag, and consequently to the 
remaining dependent variables of interest. 
Patience naturally matters due to the repetition; playing stag early on can be seen as an investment, one 
that may well be reasonable if players have low discount rates. 
In light of the documented relationships between cognitive ability, risk-aversion, and patience, a key 
feature of our study is the ability to control for potential confounds. This will help us gain a sharper 
understanding of what drives successful coordination. 
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3. Empirical results 
We ran 16 sessions during spring 2010. After eliminating observations where demographic data was 
missing or where subjects had clearly not attempted the Raven test in a serious manner, we are left with 
data from 167 subjects (yielding a total of 1670 behavioral observations).9 We first examine the 
descriptive statistics before proceeding to the formal hypothesis testing. 
A. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 details the sample means and standard deviations of the main variables. Note that the risk-
lovingness parameter is based on a MLE estimate of  in the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function   	. The mean coefficient implies near-square-root utility. In Figures 3, 4 and 5, we can see 
histograms of Raven score, patience and risk-lovingness. All three depict rich variation. 
In Figure 4, we can see that around 35% of observations imply a maximum level of patience (these 
participants all stated a preference of $10.50 in one week to $10.00 tomorrow). This is a particularly 
large proportion compared to the literature (e.g., see Andersen et al. (2009)). One possibility is that this 
was the result of our estimation procedure being one of numerous tasks in the experiment, or possibly 
due to the relatively small stakes. (Typically, experiments that measure patience do so as the only task in 
the experiment and with larger stakes.) 
Consequently, we conducted a follow-up survey with larger stakes, a finer measure of patience and 
where the only task was measuring the patience of the subjects. The results confirmed that our original 
measure of patience was not an artifact of our procedure: the correlation between the two measures 
was very high (0.69, p-value < 1%). The high level of short-run patience may have been driven by the 
exceptionally high payment credibility of GMU’s Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Sciences – the 
laboratory where the experiments were conducted.10 
In Figure 6, we can see the time path of plays of stag and of successful coordination by pairs on the stag 
equilibrium. In both series, in the second period, plays of stag and coordination on stag rise sharply. 
We also examine the autoregressive features of the strategy time series. In aggregate, 81% of plays of 
rabbit are followed by plays of rabbit, with the corresponding figure for plays of stag being 90%. 
Similarly, 88% of pairs who fail to reach the stag-stag equilibrium in a given period continue to fail in the 
subsequent period, while 93% of those that succeed continue to succeed. Thus, there is a lot of 
persistence in behavior. 
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 The Raven’s standard progressive matrices test handbook contains statistical tables designed to allow the 
experimenter to identify egregious cases of not seriously attempting the test. In our sample, only 3 subjects had 
their data dropped for this reason.  
10
 The number of students surveyed in this second patience task was large enough to establish the correlation 
across the two patience measures, but too small to add value in the regressions results, so only the in-experiment 
measure is used in the results below. 
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Table 2 depicts the sample correlations between the variables in the dataset. Consistent with the 
literature (Benjamin et al. (2006), Borghans et al. (2008), Burks et al. (2009), Dohmen et al. (2009)), we 
find a positive relationship between cognitive ability and risk-lovingness, and between cognitive ability 
and patience (though the latter relationship does not attain statistical significance).11 
Also consistent with the literature, we find that cognitive ability is uncorrelated with most personality 
traits, with a weak positive relationship between cognitive ability and openness. Our data exhibits a 
slight inconsistency with the literature in the negative relationship between cognitive ability and 
neuroticism (usually they are uncorrelated). 
Finally, in line with the literature on gender-differences (Croson and Gneezy (2009)), we find that males 
are indeed more risk-loving than females. Generally speaking, Table 2 offers us reassurance about the 
soundness of our data collection and the representativeness of our sample. 
B. Estimation strategy 
Let 
 be the value taken by a dependent variable for subject (or pair)  in period  of session . Let  
denote ’s cognitive ability,  denote ’s patience and  denote ’s risk-lovingness (the negative of risk-
aversion). Let   be a vector of ’s remaining attributes. Let  be a dummy variable that takes the value 
‘1’ in period  and ‘0’ otherwise. Let  be a dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ in session  and ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
For each dependent variable that we investigate, we estimate the following five models: 
1. 
      ∑  !"#  ∑  $"#  %; cognitive ability only, period/session effects 
2. 
    &  ∑  !"#  ∑  $"#  %; patience only, period/session effects 
3. 
    '  ∑  !"#  ∑  $"#  %; risk-lovingness only, period/session effects 
4. 
      &  ' ∑  !"#  ∑  $"#  %; cognitive ability, patience, risk-
lovingness, period/session effects 
5. 
      &  '  ( ∑  !"#  ∑  $"#  %; cognitive ability, 
patience, risk-lovingness, remaining attributes, period/session effects 
All regressions cluster the standard errors by  (individual or pair). Sometimes, we estimate models 
where the dependent variable is for a single (time) cross-section, e.g., earnings. In that case, we retain 
the same structure but we omit period effects and clustering of the standard errors (since there is at 
most one observation per individual/pair). 
As explained above, we are interested in four dependent variables: 
• Play stag dummy: A dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when player  plays stag in period  
of session , and ‘0’ if she plays rabbit 
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 Dohmen et al. (2009) summarize the extensive evidence from the psychology literature on the relationship 
between cognitive ability and patience as “mixed” (p2). 
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• Stag-stag dummy: A dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when pair  play the stag-stag 
equilibrium in period  of session , and ‘0’ if they play any of the three remaining possibilities 
• Earnings (individual): A variable denoting the total dollar earnings of player  in session  
• Earnings (pair): A variable denoting the total dollar earnings of pair  in session  
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables, we use linear 
regressions (linear probability model) rather than probits; our results are robust to using probits (results 
available upon request). 
Finally, in all regressions, unless stated otherwise, the explanatory variables are standardized by the 
sample statistics in Table 1, allowing us to interpret the estimated coefficients as the effect on the 
dependent variable of increasing the explanatory variable by one standard deviation. 
C. Main results 
We begin by analyzing how frequently subjects play stag. 
Result 1: 
a) Cognitive ability has a negligible, statistically insignificant positive effect on the probability of 
playing stag 
b) Patience has a small, statistically insignificant positive effect on the probability of playing stag 
c) Risk-lovingness has a small, statistically insignificant positive effect on the probability of playing 
stag 
d) Agreeableness (treatment effect = 6%) and being male (treatment effect = 14%) have marginally 
significant positive effects on the probability of playing stag 
This result is based on the estimates reported in Table 3. As can be seen, results (a) to (c) are robust to 
the various controls. 
Next, we turn our attention to how frequently pairs reach the stag-stag equilibrium. 
Result 2: 
a) Cognitive ability has a small, statistically insignificant negative effect on the probability of the 
pair playing stag-stag 
b) Increasing each player’s patience by one standard deviation increases the probability of the pair 
playing stag-stag by 15% (p-value < 5%)  
c) Risk-lovingness has a negligible, statistically insignificant effect on the probability of the pair 
playing stag-stag 
d) Neuroticism (15%) has a marginally significant effect, and being male (40%) has a significant 
effect on the probability of the pair playing stag-stag 
This result is based on the estimates reported in Table 4. As can be seen, results (a) to (c) are robust to 
the various controls. (In fact, the effect of patience strengthens when additional controls are 
12 
 
introduced.) The effect of patience is quite large, almost equaling a third of a standard deviation of the 
probability of a pair playing stag-stag. Even more remarkable is the very large effect of both players 
being male vs. both players being female, the former increasing the probability of playing stag-stag by 
40%. 
To illustrate the link between patience and coordination, we show two histograms in Figure 7: the 
average patience of a pair when a pair is vs. is not playing stag-stag. As can be seen, the distribution 
stochastically dominates for the observations where the pair is successfully coordinating upon stag. 
Next, we turn our attention to earnings. 
Result 3: 
a) Cognitive ability has a negligible, statistically insignificant effect on an individual’s earnings 
b) Patience has a small, statistically insignificant positive effect on an individual’s earnings 
c) Risk-lovingness has a small, statistically insignificant negative effect on an individual’s earnings 
d) Neuroticism ($0.39) and being male ($0.69) have significant positive effects on an individual’s 
earnings 
This result is based on the estimates reported in Table 5. As can be seen, results (a) to (c) are robust to 
the various controls. 
Result 4: 
a) Cognitive ability has a small, statistically insignificant negative effect on total earnings for a pair 
b) Increasing each player’s patience by one standard deviation increases a pair’s total earnings by 
$1.20 (p-value < 5%) 
c) Risk-lovingness has a small, statistically insignificant effect on total earnings for a pair 
d) Neuroticism ($1) has a marginally significant effect, and being male ($3.50) has a significant 
effect on a pair’s total earnings 
This result is based on the estimates reported in Table 6. As can be seen, results (a) to (c) are robust to 
the various controls. (In fact, the effect of patience strengthens when additional controls are 
introduced.) The effect of patience is quite large, slightly more than a third of a standard deviation. Even 
more remarkable is the very large effect of both players being male vs. both players being female, the 
former increasing total earnings for a pair by $3.50.12 
                                                           
12
 In this study, we do not attempt to explain the observed relationship between behavior/earnings and 
personality traits or gender. However it is worth making the following observation concerning the seemingly strong 
effect of being male: in light of the well-documented finding that women are more risk-averse than men, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether our measure of risk-aversion is simply a noisy measure and that being male is 
picking up the poorly measured component. To investigate this possibility, we repeat our major regressions but 
dropping the risk-lovingness regressor. We find that the coefficient on being male decreases slightly in magnitude 
(results available upon request). Combining this with the strong, positive relationship in our dataset between being 
male and our measure of risk-lovingness, we conclude that the strong effect of being male is not the consequence 
of measurement error in risk-lovingness. 
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D. Synthesizing the main results 
Our principal goal is to distinguish the effect of three variables (cognitive ability, patience and risk-
lovingness) on behavior and outcomes in a coordination game, particularly in light of the fact that 
cognitive ability is positively related to patience and risk-lovingness. 
Based on our data, behavior and outcomes in a coordination game seem to be orthogonal to cognitive 
ability. The same can be said of risk-lovingness. As an aside, being male increases the selection of the 
‘risky’ stag strategy and earnings; one might plausibly guess that this is because being male proxies for 
risk-lovingness, yet this seems not to be the case (see footnote 12). 
In contrast to cognitive ability and risk-lovingness, patience has an impact. Players who are more patient 
play stag slightly more frequently than impatient players (see Table 3), and they earn slightly more (see 
Table 5); however neither effect is statistically significant. The real impact of patience occurs when two 
patient people are matched together, with the stag-stag equilibrium frequency and total group earnings 
both rising. To confirm this, we repeat the regressions that correspond to Result 2 and Result 4 with one 
difference: rather than using the average patience of a pair, we use the minimum patience or the 
maximum patience. Using the maximum renders the effect of patience statistically insignificant, while 
using the minimum generally strengthens the statistical significance (results omitted for parsimony and 
available upon request). This confirms that there is a key complementarity between the patience of the 
two players: there is evidence of a “weak link” or O-ring element to successful coordination (Kremer 
(1993)). 
E. Additional results: dynamics 
Pairs of patient players are substantially (15% per standard deviation) more likely to play stag-stag than 
impatient pairs, yet patient individuals are only slightly more likely (4% per standard deviation) than 
impatient players to play stag. How can these seemingly inconsistent observations be reconciled? 
The key lies in digging deeper into the dynamics. Let us define ‘patient’ players as those with above-
mean patience and ‘impatient’ players as those with below-mean patience. Figure 8 shows the time 
series of plays of stag by patient vs. impatient players, confirming that patient players are only slightly 
more likely to play stag than impatient players. The averages rates are 66% for patient players and 62% 
for impatient players. 
Given that type-X players play stag Y% of the time on average, the breakdown will lie between two 
extremes: 
1. Y% of type-X players always play stag and (100 – Y)% always play rabbit (maximum between-
player variation, minimum within-player variation)  
2. All type-X players play stag Y% of the time and rabbit (100 – Y)% of the time (minimum 
between-player variation, maximum within-player variation) 
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Intuitively, it is easier for a player to coordinate on stag-stag if her partner never varies from playing 
stag himself. If instead they are switching randomly between stag and rabbit (the second extreme), it is 
much harder to ensure that both players simultaneously play stag. Further, when a player plays rabbit in 
the previous period, she is unaware of what her partner played. Rabbit, considered the safe strategy in a 
one-shot game, becomes a low-information strategy (and hence a risky strategy) in the repeated game.  
This intuition is supported by the data. When both players play stag, a player plays stag in the following 
round 96% of the time; in contrast, when one plays stag and the other plays rabbit, the one playing stag 
persists with stag only 51% of the time. 
With this in mind, it is possible that, in addition to playing stag slightly more frequently than impatient 
players, patient players play with greater persistence, i.e., lower within-player variation and higher 
between-player variation (closer to extreme 1 above). This is precisely what we find in Results 5 and 6 
below. 
 Result 5: 
a) Cognitive ability has a statistically insignificant effect on the persistence of playing stag and 
rabbit  
b) Increasing a player’s patience by one standard deviation increases his/her probability of 
continuing a play of stag by 6% and of continuing a play of rabbit by 5% 
c) Risk-lovingness has a statistically insignificant effect on the persistence of playing stag and 
rabbit 
d) Being male increases the probability of continuing a play of stag by 16% 
This result is based on the estimates reported in Tables 7 and 8. Note that in both tables, the omitted 
estimated coefficients on the constant, period and session effects all imply that there is a baseline 
persistence in play (this is also reflected in the statistics reported at the end of the Descriptive Statistics 
section above). Consequently, the estimated coefficient on patience implies an accentuation of the 
persistence. 
Let ) be the standard deviation of player ’s play stag dummy (across rounds). The average of ) for 
group X (which we denote )*() is a measure of the within-player variation in stag play. If group X plays 
stag Y% of the time, then: 
)*( + ,0,/ 
10011 2 
10034 
Where the lower bound corresponds to purely between-player variation (extreme case 1 above) and the 
upper bound corresponds to purely within-player variation (extreme case 2 above). In the following 
result, recall that we define “impatient players” as those with below-mean patience, and “patient 
players” as those with above-mean patience.  
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Result 6: Patient players exhibit substantially less within-player variation in their stag play ()*5678 = 
0.16) than impatient players ()*95678 = 0.24); (p-value < 5% using a t-test or a MW-test). 
Result 6 reinforces Result 5.13 Patient pairs play stag-stag more often due to a combination of two 
factors: 
1. Patient players play stag slightly more often 
2. Patient players are more persistent in their choices, making it easier for both players to 
coordinate on stag-stag 
4. Conclusion 
Political scientist Robert Putnam, author of the widely-discussed book Bowling Alone, defines social 
capital as “features of social organization… that facilitate coordination and cooperation” (Putnam, 1995, 
p. 67). According to the results presented here the definition of social capital may need to be expanded 
beyond “social organization” to include a group’s average level of patience as well. We found that pairs 
of players who were on average more patient – who had a lower rate of time preference – were much 
more likely to coordinate in a stag hunt, a classic game of team effort. 
In a separate paper (Al-Ubaydli et al. (2010)), we find that average IQ of a pair of players predicts 
cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, another metaphor for social interactions. Clark (2007) 
provides evidence that rates of time preference (proxied by risk-free interest rates) have differed across 
societies and across centuries. According to our results, that may help explain why different political, 
economic, and social institutions have been sustained across the millennia: with more patient members 
of society, better equilibria have a higher probability of being sustained. Cross-sectionally, economists 
have routinely found that time preference differs across groups: the future is discounted more heavily 
by low-income individuals (e.g., Lawrance (1991)) and by smokers (a literature beginning with Fuchs 
(1982)). Our results indicate that if groups differ in patience, there are likely to be substantial social 
consequences. 
 
  
                                                           
13
 Note that Result 6 is not driven by the effect of the 4% difference in average stag play on the upper bound of )*, 
since the difference in the upper bounds is less than 0.02. 
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Stag
Rabbit
Row (column) denotes player 1’s (2’s) strategy choice. First (second) number denotes player 1’s 
(2’s) payoff. 
Figure 3
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Figure 1: Stag hunt 
Figure 2: Order of tasks 
 
: Histogram of standardized Raven score 
Mean = 42, standard deviation = 5.5 
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Figure 4: Histogram of standardized patience 
Mean = 16, standard deviation = 4.2 
 
Figure 5: Histogram of standardized risk-lovingness 
Mean = 0.63, standard deviation = 0.23 
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Figure 6: Time series of individual plays of Stag and pair plays of Stag-Stag 
 
Figure 7: Histograms of standardized average patience of pair of players 
The left histogram corresponds to observations where the pair were not playing stag-stag, i.e., 
the stag-stag dummy = 0; the right histogram corresponds to observations where the pair were 
playing stag-stag, i.e., the stag-stag dummy = 1. Both histograms are standardized by the same 
mean and standard deviation. 
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Figure 8: Time series of individual plays of Stag 
‘Impatient’ refers to players who have below-mean patience and ‘Patient’ refers to players who 
have above-mean patience. 
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Tables 
Variable Mean SD 
Raven score 42 (5.5) 
Patience 16 (4.2) 
Risk-lovingness parameter 0.63 (0.23) 
Openness (-2 to +2 likert) 0.81 (0.54) 
Conscientiousness (-2 to +2 likert) 0.48 (0.65) 
Extraversion (-2 to +2 likert) 0.22 (0.73) 
Agreeableness (-2 to +2 likert) 1.0 (0.49) 
Neuroticism (-2 to +2 likert) -0.10 (0.74) 
Age (years) 24 (4.5) 
Male (dummy) 0.68 (0.47) 
Play stag (dummy) 0.64 (0.48) 
Pair playing stag-stag (dummy) 0.55 (0.50) 
Game earnings, individual ($) 5.9 (1.6) 
Game earnings, pair ($) 12 (3.1) 
Table 1: Sample statistics 
Data comes from 167 observations 
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Individual earnings 0.78*** - - - - - - - - - - 
Raven 0.0072 -0.017 - - - - - - - - - 
Risk-lovingness 0.063 -0.047 0.21*** - - - - - - - - 
Patience 0.10 0.15* 0.072 -0.047 - - - - - - - 
Openness -0.011 0.017 0.15* 0.10 -0.10 - - - - - - 
Conscientiousness -0.047 0.016 0.11 -0.028 0.12 0.053 - - - - - 
Extraversion -0.057 -0.037 0.022 -0.024 -0.12* 0.27*** 0.16** - - - - 
Agreeableness 0.077 0.00050 0.037 0.011 -0.060 0.21*** 0.19** 0.36*** - - - 
Neuroticism 0.11 0.18** -0.21*** -0.14* 0.055 -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.36*** -0.10 - - 
Age -0.0066 -0.046 0.070 -0.029 0.010 -0.051 -0.066 -0.10 -0.0066 0.089 - 
Male 0.094 0.077 0.090 0.34*** 0.017 -0.084 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.19** -0.019 
Table 2: Sample correlations 
Based on a sample of size 167. Asterices denote statistical significance: *= 10%, **= 5%, ***= 1%.
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual 
Cognitive ability 
0.0057 - - -0.0041 -0.0011 
(0.030) - - (0.031) (0.031) 
Patience 
- 0.044 - 0.043 0.046 
- (0.030) - (0.030) (0.030) 
Risk-lovingness 
- - 0.026 0.025 0.0032 
- - (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) 
Openness 
- - - - 0.00027 
- - - - (0.031) 
Conscientiousness 
- - - - 0.0048 
- - - - (0.028) 
Extraversion 
- - - - -0.015 
- - - - (0.034) 
Agreeableness 
- - - - 0.058* 
- - - - (0.033) 
Neuroticism 
- - - - 0.045 
- - - - (0.031) 
Male (dummy; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 0.14* 
- - - - (0.076) 
Age (in years; not 
standardized) 
- - - - -0.0014 
- - - - (0.007) 
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15 
Observations 1670 1670 1670 1670 1670 
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 3: The effect of attributes on the probability of playing stag 
Estimates are based on a linear probability model. Unless otherwise stated, all explanatory 
variables are standardized based on the figures in Table 1. Unit refers to ‘individual’ vs. ‘group,’ 
i.e., whether the dependent variable is defined at the level of the individual vs. pair. Esimated 
coefficients on constant, period and session effects omitted for parsimony. Asterices denote 
statistical significance: *= 10%, **= 5%, ***= 1%. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable 
Stag-stag 
dummy 
Stag-stag 
dummy 
Stag-stag 
dummy 
Stag-stag 
dummy 
Stag-stag 
dummy 
Unit Pair Pair Pair Pair Pair 
Cognitive ability 
-0.030 - - -0.071 -0.095 
(0.077) - - (0.084) (0.088) 
Patience 
- 0.13** - 0.14** 0.15** 
- (0.056) - (0.056) (0.072) 
Risk-lovingness 
- - 0.027 0.037 -0.00076 
- - (0.080) (0.083) (0.083) 
Openness 
- - - - 0.078 
- - - - (0.079) 
Conscientiousness 
- - - - -0.020 
- - - - (0.088) 
Extraversion 
- - - - 0.019 
- - - - (0.095) 
Agreeableness 
- - - - 0.11 
- - - - (0.072) 
Neuroticism 
- - - - 0.15* 
- - - - (0.076) 
Male (dummy; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 0.40*** 
- - - - (0.15) 
Age (in years; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 0.0011 
- - - - (0.021) 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.26 
Observations 830 830 830 830 830 
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4: The effect of attributes on the probability of reaching stag-stag 
All explanatory variables are based on the average of the values of the two members of the pair. 
See Table 3 for additional explanation. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual 
Cognitive ability 
-0.0067 - - -0.0093 0.0089 
(0.12) - - (0.13) (0.13) 
Patience 
- 0.21 - 0.21 0.20 
- (0.13) - (0.13) (0.14) 
Risk-lovingness 
- - -0.063 -0.069 -0.15 
- - (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Openness 
- - - - 0.12 
- - - - (0.13) 
Conscientiousness 
- - - - 0.19 
- - - - (0.13) 
Extraversion 
- - - - 0.036 
- - - - (0.14) 
Agreeableness 
- - - - 0.071 
- - - - (0.13) 
Neuroticism 
- - - - 0.39*** 
- - - - (0.14) 
Male (dummy; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 0.69** 
- - - - (0.30) 
Age (in years; not 
standardized) 
- - - - -0.032 
- - - - (0.029) 
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.27 
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 
Period effects No No No No No 
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering No No No No No 
Table 5: The effect of attributes on individual earnings 
See Table 3 for additional explanation. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Earnings 
($) 
Unit Group Group Group Group Group 
Cognitive ability 
-0.13 - - -0.47 -0.63 
(0.57) - - (0.63) (0.67) 
Patience 
- 1.0** - 1.1** 1.2** 
- (0.41) - (0.42) (0.53) 
Risk-lovingness 
- - 0.27 0.32 -0.098 
- - (0.57) (0.60) (0.62) 
Openness 
- - - - 0.73 
- - - - (0.60) 
Conscientiousness 
- - - - -0.040 
- - - - (0.65) 
Extraversion 
- - - - 0.12 
- - - - (0.74) 
Agreeableness 
- - - - 0.66 
- - - - (0.57) 
Neuroticism 
- - - - 1.0* 
- - - - (0.58) 
Male (dummy; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 3.5*** 
- - - - (1.1) 
Age (in years; not 
standardized) 
- - - - -0.037 
- - - - (0.17) 
R-squared 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.37 
Observations 83 83 83 83 83 
Period effects No No No No No 
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering No No No No No 
Table 6: The effect of attributes on total earnings for a pair 
All explanatory variables are based on the average of the values of the two members of the pair. 
See Table 3 for additional explanation. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual 
Cognitive ability 
0.0065 - - -0.0012 0.0023 
(0.015) - - (0.015) (0.015) 
Patience 
- 0.060** - 0.059** 0.059** 
- (0.024) - (0.024) (0.023) 
Risk-lovingness 
- - 0.021 0.019 -0.013 
- - (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Openness 
- - - - 0.031* 
- - - - (0.018) 
Conscientiousness 
- - - - 0.011 
- - - - (0.018) 
Extraversion 
- - - - -0.0087 
- - - - (0.021) 
Agreeableness 
- - - - -0.0070 
- - - - (0.020) 
Neuroticism 
- - - - 0.023 
- - - - (0.020) 
Male (dummy; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 0.16*** 
- - - - (0.046) 
Age (in years; not 
standardized) 
- - - - -0.0020 
- - - - (0.0035) 
R-squared 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.19 
Observations 973 973 973 973 973 
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 7: The effect of attributes on the probability of playing stag given having played stag in the 
previous period 
See Table 3 for additional explanation. 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Play stag 
dummy 
Unit Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual 
Cognitive ability 
-0.027 - - -0.017 0.0095 
(0.024) - - (0.025) (0.028) 
Patience 
- -0.040 - -0.038 -0.052** 
- (0.026) - (0.025) (0.023) 
Risk-lovingness 
- - -0.024 -0.016 0.0018 
- - (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) 
Openness 
- - - - -0.025 
- - - - (0.020) 
Conscientiousness 
- - - - -0.0027 
- - - - (0.027) 
Extraversion 
- - - - -0.022 
- - - - (0.024) 
Agreeableness 
- - - - 0.036 
- - - - (0.025) 
Neuroticism 
- - - - 0.027 
- - - - (0.030) 
Male (dummy; not 
standardized) 
- - - - -0.090 
- - - - (0.067) 
Age (in years; not 
standardized) 
- - - - 0.00050 
- - - - (0.0077) 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.22 
Observations 530 530 530 530 530 
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Session effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 8: The effect of attributes on the probability of playing stag given having played rabbit in the 
previous period 
See Table 3 for additional explanation. 
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Experimental instructions 
Welcome to our study in decision-making. Today’s experiment will be done on the computer. You each 
have a printed copy of the instructions. I will read through those. 
If you pay attention and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. At the 
end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings privately and in cash. I remind you that today’s 
experiment will take approximately 90 minutes. Today you will do several different tasks. 
Just for showing up, you have earned $5. All earnings for today’s tasks will be in addition to the $5. 
For the remainder of this experiment, please refrain from any communication with other participants. 
Please put away your cell phones. 
The first two tasks are Task 1 and Task 2. Later on, you will do Task 4 and Task 5. In each of these tasks, 
the choices that you make will determine your earnings. However you will only be paid the earnings that 
correspond to one of the four tasks. At the end of the experiment, I will roll a die to determine which of 
the three tasks will be used to determine your earnings for Task 1, Task 2, Task 4 and Task 5. You will 
have a 10% change of being paid for Task 5 and an equal (30%) chance of being paid for each of the 
other three tasks. 
Task 1 
You will be put into pairs randomly. You will never know the identity of your partner. You will only 
interact with your partner. You will play the game with the same partner over 10 rounds. 
• If you select Blue, then you earn exactly $0.50 regardless of what your partner selects. 
• If you select Green, then: 
o If your partner also selects Green, then you earn $0.75. 
o If your partner selects Blue, then you earn $0. 
Your partner faces exactly the same decision and earnings. You will play this for 10 rounds. At the end of 
each round, you will find out how much you earned for that round. You will then proceed to the next 
round. 
Task 2
14
 
You will again be put into pairs randomly. Your partner in Task 2 is guaranteed to be different to your 
partner in Task 1. You will never know the identity of your partner. You will only interact with your 
partner. You will play the game with the same partner over 10 rounds. 
                                                           
14
 Task 2 is the prisoner’s dilemma; see footnote 3. 
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• If you select Square, then: 
o If your partner also selects Square, then you earn $0.25. 
o If your partner selects Circle, then you earn $1.50. 
• If you select Circle, then: 
o If your partner selects Square, then you earn $0. 
o If your partner also selects Circle, then you earn $1. 
Your partner faces exactly the same decision and earnings. You will play this for 10 rounds. At the end of 
each round, you will find out how much you earned for that round. You will then proceed to the next 
round. 
Task 3 
Task 3 is a survey that we would like you to complete. You will be paid $5 for completing this short 
survey. We will pay you as soon as you complete the survey. 
Please answer the questions carefully and truthfully. We guarantee that we will treat these surveys with 
the utmost confidentiality. I will now read the instructions in front of you. 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you 
honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your 
same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in 
absolute confidence. 
Indicate for each statement whether it is: 
1. Very Inaccurate 
2. Moderately Inaccurate 
3. Neither Accurate Nor Inaccurate 
4. Moderately Accurate 
5. Very Accurate 
as a description of you. 
1. Am the life of the party. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
2. Feel little concern for others. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
3. Am always prepared. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
4. Get stressed out easily. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
5. Have a rich vocabulary. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
6. Don't talk a lot. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
7. Am interested in people. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
8. Leave my belongings around. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
9. Am relaxed most of the time. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
10. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
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11. Feel comfortable around people. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
12. Insult people. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
13. Pay attention to details. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
14. Worry about things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
15. Have a vivid imagination. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
16. Keep in the background. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
17. Sympathize with others' feelings. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
18. Make a mess of things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
19. Seldom feel blue. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
20. Am not interested in abstract ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
21. Start conversations. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
22. Am not interested in other people's problems. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
23. Get chores done right away. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
24. Am easily disturbed. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
25. Have excellent ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
26. Have little to say. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
27. Have a soft heart. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
28. Often forget to put things back in their proper place. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
29. Get upset easily. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
30. Do not have a good imagination. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
31. Talk to a lot of different people at parties. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
32. Am not really interested in others. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
33. Like order. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
34. Change my mood a lot. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
35. Am quick to understand things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
36. Don't like to draw attention to myself. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
37. Take time out for others. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
38. Shirk my duties. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
39. Have frequent mood swings. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
40. Use difficult words. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
41. Don't mind being the center of attention. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
42. Feel others' emotions. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
43. Follow a schedule. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
44. Get irritated easily. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
45. Spend time reflecting on things. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
46. Am quiet around strangers. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
47. Make people feel at ease. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
48. Am exacting in my work. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
49. Often feel blue. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
50. Am full of ideas. 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
[Demographic survey] 
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1. What is your age in years? 
2. What is your gender? Male / Female 
3. Do you live on campus or off campus? 
4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? Less than high school / High school 
diploma or GED / Bachelor’s degree / Master’s degree / Doctoral degree 
5. What class are you in? Freshman / Sophomore / Junior / Senior / MA student / Pre-dissertation PhD 
student / Dissertation PhD student 
6. In what range is your GPA? 0 to 2.0 / 2.1 to 2.5 / 2.6 to 3.0 / 3.1 to 3.5 / 3.6 to 4.0 
7. If you took it, what was your SAT verbal score? (Leave blank if you did not take it.) 
8. If you took it, what was your SAT quantitative score? (Leave blank if you did not take it.) 
9. If you took it, what was your GRE verbal score? (Leave blank if you did not take it.) 
10. If you took it, what was your GRE quantitative score? (Leave blank if you did not take it.) 
11. If you took it, what was your GRE analytical score? (Leave blank if you did not take it.) 
 Task 4 
In this task you will make decisions alone and your earnings will not depend upon the decisions of 
others. Recall that at the end of the experiment, we will roll a die to determine which out of Task 1, Task 
2, Task 4 and Task 5 will be used to determine your earnings for the four tasks. You will have a 10% 
change of being paid for Task 5 and an equal (30%) chance of being paid for each of the other three 
tasks. 
You will be given a series of choices between two games of chance. For each pair of games, you should 
indicate which of the two games you prefer to play. If you end up getting paid for Task 4, you will 
actually get the chance to play one of the games of chance you choose, so you should think carefully 
about which games of chance you prefer. 
Here is a pair of games of chance like the ones you will see on your screen, although the display on your 
screen will be bigger and easier to read. 
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The outcome of the games of chance will be determined by a random number between 1 and 8. Each 
number between (and including) 1 and 8 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be able to roll the 
number yourself using a 8-sided die. 
In the above example, the left game pays nothing ($0) if the random number is between 1 and 7, and 
pays $30 if the random number is 8. Notice that the size of the pie slices shows you the chances of each 
possible outcome. 
In the above example, the game on the right pays nothing ($0) if the random number is between 1 and 
6, and pays $10 if the random number is between 7 and 8. As with the game on the left, the pie slices 
represent the fraction of the possible numbers which yield each payoff. 
Each pair of games is on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you should indicate which 
of the games you prefer to play by clicking on one of the three boxes beneath the games. You should 
click the ‘Left’ box if you prefer the game on the left, the ‘Right’ box if you prefer the game on the right, 
and the ‘Don’t care’ button if you do not prefer one or the other. 
You should approach each pair of games as if it is the only pair of games you are considering, because if 
you end up getting paid for this task, you are only going to play one of the many games. If you chose 
‘Don’t care’ in the games that we play out, we will pick one for you using a coin flip. 
If you end up getting paid for Task 4, then at the end of the experiment, after you have worked through 
all of the pairs of games, we will roll a die to determine which pair of games have been chosen to play. If 
you picked ‘Don’t care’ for that pair, we will flip a coin to decide which one you will play. Then we will let 
you roll the die to determine the outcome of the game you chose (or the game that was selected for you 
based on the coin flip). 
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For instance, suppose you picked the game on the left in the above example. If your die roll was 6, you 
would win nothing; if it was 8, you would get $30. If you picked the game on the right and rolled a 6, you 
would win nothing; if it was 8, you would get $10. 
Therefore if end up getting paid for Task 4, then your earnings are determined by three things: 
1. Which pair of games of chance is chosen at random to be played out. 
2. Which game you chose for the pair selected to be played. 
3. The outcome of the game when you roll a die. 
This is not a test of whether you can pick the best game in each pair, because none of the games are 
necessarily better than the others. Which games you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people 
next to you may have different tastes, so their responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, 
and make your choices by thinking carefully about each game. 
As a reminder, whether or not you get paid for Task 4 does not affect your earnings from other tasks. 
Task 5 
In this task you will make decisions alone and your earnings will not depend upon the decisions of 
others. Recall that at the end of the experiment, we will roll a die to determine which out of Task 1, Task 
2, Task 4 and Task 5 will be used to determine your earnings for the four tasks. You will have a 10% 
change of being paid for Task 5 and an equal (30%) chance of being paid for each of the other three 
tasks. 
In the following sheet you are asked to choose between smaller payments tomorrow and larger 
payments in the future. Each choice looks like the one below: 
 
Instead of X and Y you will see actual dollar amounts. For each row, choose one payment: either the 
smaller, sooner payment or the larger, later payment. There are 20 decisions in total. 
If you end up getting paid for Task 5, you will each roll a die to select one of the 20 rows at random. We 
will then pay you according to your choice for that row. Any one of the rows could be the row that 
counts! Treat each decision as if it could be the one that determines your payment. 
We will place the money in an envelope in front of you. You will then seal the envelope and sign across 
the seal. We will then walk with you to Carow Hall, which is the building across the parking lot, and hand 
the envelope to Ms. Jane Perry, who is a staff member. You can pick up the payment either tomorrow or 
a week from now, depending on the choice you made. You can also pick up the envelope at any later 
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time. You will be given a letter on university letterhead confirming this procedure. You each have an 
example in front of you. 
[There are 20 rows; X is always $10.00, Y starts at $10.50 and increases in $0.50 increments until $20.00] 
[Following letter is personalized and is printed on GMU letterhead] 
 
Task 6 
This is the final task in the experiment. You will be paid $10 for completing this test. We will pay you as 
soon as you complete the test. The test will take 45 minutes. Once the 45 minutes are finished, we will 
pay you for Task 6 in addition to any outstanding earnings from previous tasks. Please note that your 
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earnings will not depend upon the number of correct answers you give. You will be paid $10 at the end 
of the 45 minutes. 
As with all other aspects of this experiment, your choices are completely confidential. 
The next task consists of a sequence of puzzles. You will find on your desk a black booklet. Please do not 
write in the booklet. Please open the booklet to page A1. 
On each page there is a pattern at the top with a missing segment, and a number of possible 
completions for the missing segment at the bottom. Only one of these correctly completes the pattern. 
It is up to you to select the right option that completes the pattern.  
For page A1, the correct answer is 4. Please find the answer sheet on your desk and write number 4 in 
the first box in column A. 
Now turn to page A2. The correct answer is 5. Please write number 5 in the second box in column A on 
the answer sheet. 
Now you are on your own. Have a look at the remaining pages and try to answer each problem as best 
you can. 
 
 
[Above is a sample problem from the Raven’s test] 
